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Abstract: 
 
Evidence based medicine has claimed to be science on a number of occasions but it 
is not clear that this status is deserved. Within philosophy of science four main 
theories about the nature of science are historically recognised: inductivism, 
falsificationism, Kuhnian paradigms and research programmes. If evidence based 
medicine is science knowledge claims should be derived using a process that 
corresponds to one of these theories. This paper analyses whether this is the case. 
In the first section, different theories about the nature of science are introduced. In 
the second section, the claim that evidence based medicine is science is 
reinterpreted as the claim that knowledge claims derived from randomised controlled 
trails and meta-analyses are science. In the third section the knowledge claims 
valued within evidence based medicine are considered from the perspective of 
inductivism, falsificationism, Kuhnian paradigms and research programmes. In the 
final section possible counter arguments are considered. It is argued that the 
knowledge claims valued by evidence based medicine are not justified using 
inductivism, falsificationism, Kuhnian paradigms or research programmes. If these 
are the main criteria for evaluating if something is science or not, evidence based 
medicine does not meet these criteria. 
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1. Introduction:  
 
Evidence based medicine has had a significant influence on modern medicine since 
the concept was first articulated in 1992. It has been used to produce vast numbers 
of clinical guidelines and these guidelines dictate which medical interventions are 
provided and funded (1). Evidence based medicine has been important in the 
governance of medicine providing standards that medical care can be judged 
against. These standards have facilitated the identification of variation in medical 
practice and may provide the legal standard of care (2). It has also influenced the 
medical research agenda becoming increasingly dominant as the mainstay of 
medical research funding (3). Evidence based medicine has therefore become 
extremely important to research and policy makers. 
 
Evidence based medicine has been claimed to be science on a number of different 
occasions. Many of the earliest hierarchies of evidence professed to be scientific (4, 
5, 6) and some commentators claimed that evidence based medicine constituted a 
new Kuhnian paradigm (7, 8, 9). ,QGHHGLWKDVDOVREHHQWKHFDVHWKDWµVFLHQWLILF
medicine¶ was proposed as an alternative name for evidence based medicine when 
the concept was first developed. This name, however, was abandoned because it 
implied that medicine had previously been unscientific (10).  
 
Science is often considered epistemically superior to other forms of knowledge 
because it uses the scientific method to provide justification for knowledge claims 
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that are made (11). This use of the scientific method gives knowledge claims arrived 
at through this approach a privileged status making such claims more difficult to 
challenge (12). By claiming to be science evidence based medicine is seeking to 
ensure that its knowledge claims deserve this privileged status. It follows that if 
evidence based medicine is not science this privileged status is not deserved and we 
may question whether the concept should have such a significant influence on 
modern medicine. 
 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the claim that evidence based medicine is 
science. In the first section, different theories about the nature of science will be 
presented: inductivism as practiced by the logical positivist movement (13), 
falsificationism (14), Kuhnian paradigms (15) and scientific research programmes 
(16). In the second section, the claim that evidence based medicine is science will be 
reinterpreted as the claim that knowledge claims derived from randomised controlled 
trails and meta-analyses are science. In the third section, these knowledge claims 
will be considered from the perspective of the different theories about the nature of 
science. In the final section possible counter arguments are anticipated. As we shall 
see the claim that evidence based medicine is science cannot be justified on this 
basis because the knowledge claims made by evidence based medicine are not 
justified by the four theories that are presented. 
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2. Theories about the Nature of Science: 
 
There is a common misconception that there is a single scientific method. However, 
within philosophy of science, four main theories about the nature of science are 
recognised to be historically important: inductivism (13), falsificationism (14), 
Kuhnian paradigms (15) and research programmes (16). All of these theories are 
considered problematic from an epistemological perspective and no one theory is 
considered superior to the others. These theories about the nature of science have 
been comprehensively discussed elsewhere (11, 17, 18, 19). Here they are 
presented in sufficient detail to provide a foundation for the analysis presented in the 
rest of the paper. 
 
The first theory that will be outlined is inductivism. Inductivism places a high value on 
explanatory theory and proposes that scientific method involves the confirmation of 
theory by observation. In inductivism, theories are used to generate predictions and 
these are tested in experiments. When a predicted outcome is observed the theory is 
confirmed and the observation is considered to provide justification for the 
knowledge claim made by the theory (13). Inductivism is considered problematic 
because inductive argumentation is fallible (11). This problem led Karl Popper to 
develop falsificationism (14). 
 
Falsificationism also places a high value on explanatory theory but this theory 
proposes that scientific method involves the falsification of theory by observation. 
6 
 
Falsificationism employs deductive reasoning therefore any conclusions are 
necessarily true if the premises are true (14). Falsificationism has also been 
considered problematic because theories are not simply tested through falsification 
but in conjunction with auxiliary assumptions and background knowledge. As a 
consequence an observation that challenges an existing theory does not necessarily 
prove that the theory is false because it might also be that an auxiliary assumption or 
background knowledge was false (11, 17). 
 
The third theory that will be considered is the theory of Kuhnian paradigms. Thomas 
Kuhn argued that normal science occurred within an established paradigm and was 
characterised by puzzle solving. Puzzle solving is guided by a disciplinary matrix and 
exemplars. The disciplinary matrix includes the general theoretical laws, instruments 
and assumptions that scientists use and governs permissible concepts, problems 
and explanations. Exemplars demonstrate the problem solving techniques that can 
be used to extend and elaborate the scope of a paradigm (15). 
 
Puzzle solving by scientists within an established paradigm has three important 
elements: the matching of facts with theory, the articulation of the consequences of 
theory and determination of significant facts. The paradigm is assumed to guarantee 
the existence of a solution to every puzzle and failures within normal science are 
blamed upon individual scientists not the paradigm itself. However, as normal 
science progresses, experimental and theoretical anomalies accumulate and a crisis 
emerges. Crises are resolved by the emergence of a new paradigm and a paradigm 
shift occurs (15). 
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The theory of scientific research programmes was developed by Imre Lakatos. A 
scientific research programme consists of a hard core of fundamental principles 
surrounded by a protective belt of auxiliary assumptions. Work within any research 
programme is guided by the heuristic and may involve the falsification or 
confirmation of theory through observation. This theory differentiates between 
degenerating and progressive research programmes. A degenerating research 
programme only accommodates known facts whereas a progressive research 
programme continues to produce novel facts. Within this theory science is 
characterised by the continued production of novel facts (16).  
 
The four theories introduced in this section are all theories about the nature of 
science. Nonetheless, it is important to make a distinction between inductivism and 
falsificationism on one hand and Kuhnian paradigms and scientific research 
programmes on the other hand. Inductivism and falsificationism are theories of 
scientific method whereas Kuhnian paradigms and research programmes are 
broader theories that emphasise the importance of the framework within which 
science is undertaken. This distinction is important when we consider the claim that 
evidence based medicine is science. 
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3. Evidence Based Medicine: 
 
Superficial consideration of the claim that evidence based medicine is science 
suggests that the claim may be meaningless. Evidence based medicine is used to 
determine the most appropriate medical care whereas the aim of science is to 
provide explanation and understanding (19). However, the claim can be reformulated 
so that it is meaningful. When evidence based medicine is claimed to be science 
what is really meant is that the knowledge claims that inform decision making within 
evidence based medicine are science.  
 
Within evidence based medicine hierarchies of evidence are used to rank the 
importance of knowledge claims derived from different study designs (20). These 
hierarchies of evidence generally rank meta-analyses and randomised controlled 
trials as the highest level of evidence, observational studies as an intermediate level 
of evidence and expert opinion as the lowest level of evidence (21, 22). Evidence 
based medicine does not only use evidence derived from meta-analyses and 
randomised controlled trials but it has a clear preference for knowledge claims 
derived using these study designs.  
 
Randomised controlled trials, meta-analyses and indeed all comparative studies, are 
typically set up to test the null hypothesis that there is no difference in outcome 
between a treatment intervention and a control intervention. If a difference is found, 
the probability of the observed difference occurring by chance, if there really is no 
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difference between the two treatment interventions, is calculated. The null 
hypothesis is then accepted or rejected depending upon a preassigned probability 
value.  
 
It is important to appreciate that the treatment interventions that are tested in 
randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses are supported by underlying theory. 
These treatment interventions undergo rigorous laboratory and animal testing before 
randomised controlled trials are undertaken on human subjects (23). During this 
development, experiments are repeated, new instruments are developed and 
underlying theory may be modified. However, this underlying theory is not directly 
tested when the null hypotheses is accepted or rejected. We therefore make an 
important distinction between knowledge claims made within basic medical science 
and knowledge claims made using randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses.  
 
If knowledge claims derived from randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses are 
science the method that is used to produce these knowledge claims should 
correspond to an established theory about the nature of science. The hierarchies of 
evidence themselves should not be confused with science as they simply rank the 
importance of evidence derived from different study designs. However, this does not 
mean that the hierarchies are unimportant. The hierarchies of evidence are actually 
fundamental to our analysis because they dictate the study designs that are 
preferred within evidence based medicine.  
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There has already been a limited discussion in the literature about whether 
randomised controlled trials use inductivism or falsificationism (9, 24, 25, 26, 27). 
However, this discussion is generally predicated on the assumption that randomised 
controlled trials are science. Senn (1991) argued that the method used by clinical 
trials to produce knowledge claims corresponded to falsificationism (24). This 
argument was disputed by Shahar (1997) who argued that null hypotheses could not 
be falsified (25). Shahar (1997) instead claimed that randomised controlled trials 
used inductivism although this claim was disputed by Kerry et al (2012) because the 
results of these studies were presented in terms of probabilities (27). Thompson 
(2010) has claimed that randomised controlled trials did not use either inductivism or 
falsificationism because they did not provide explanation (26). 
 
As the theories of Kuhnian paradigms and research programme are broader theories 
about the nature of science it is more meaningful to consider whether evidence 
based medicine itself is science in relation to these theories. The claim that evidence 
based medicine is a new paradigm has been discussed in detail in the medical 
literature (9, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36). This claim has proved contentious 
and considerable disagreement exists with a number of different arguments being 
used to both support and refute the claim. Interestingly the discussion in the 
literature assumes that evidence based medicine is science but this assumption is 
not explicitly considered. There has been no discussion in the literature about 
whether evidence based medicine corresponds to the theory of research 
programmes. There is therefore a need to analyse the claim that evidence based 
medicine is science in relation to the four theories presented. 
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4. Evidence Based Medicine as Science: 
 
Having laid the groundwork we will now analyse the claim that evidence based 
medicine is science. We will first consider whether the method used by randomised 
controlled trials and meta-analyses, within the framework imposed by hierarchies of 
evidence, corresponds to the scientific methods of inductivism or falsificationism. We 
will then consider whether evidence based medicine itself can be considered science 
using the theories of Kuhnian paradigms or scientific research programmes. 
 
4.1 Inductivism: 
 
Inductivism places a high value on explanatory theory and involves the confirmation 
of theory by observation. Randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses do not use 
inductivism because they are set up to test null hypotheses. The theory underlying 
the treatment intervention that is investigated cannot be confirmed because it is not 
directly tested. Null hypotheses are actually accepted or rejected using inference to 
best explanation. This does not mean that underlying theory is not considered when 
knowledge claims are interpreted but this theory is not relevant to the production of 
the knowledge claim. 
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The hierarchies of evidence contain a variety of different study designs in addition to 
meta-analyses and randomised controlled trials. One of these study designs, the 
prospective case series, does employ inductivism. In a prospective case series all 
patients are given a treatment intervention and outcomes are recorded. The theory 
underlying the treatment intervention is then confirmed to a greater or lesser extent 
depending on the outcomes that are observed. Prospective case series can provide 
compelling evidence for the effectiveness of a treatment intervention when all study 
subjects EHQHILWIURPWUHDWPHQW7KLVLVWKHµDOO-or-QRQH¶VWXG\GHVLJQ+RZever, 
prospective case series are usually excluded or devalued by hierarchies of evidence. 
We are aware of only one hierarchy of evidence WKDWUDQNVµDOO-or-QRQH¶VWXG\
designs amongst the highest levels of evidence (37). It appears that evidence based 
medicine does not value the one study design that does use inductivism. 
 
The hierarchies of evidence rarely include explanatory theory and this type of 
evidence would normally be subsumed within expert opinion. Hierarchies usually 
rank expert opinion as the lowest level of evidence. Evidence based medicine has a 
clear preference for knowledge claims derived from empirical study designs that 
accept or reject null hypotheses using inference to best explanation and does not 
appear to value explanatory theory. We would therefore argue that the knowledge 
claims that are important within evidence based medicine are not justified using 
inductivism. 
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4.2. Falsificationism: 
 
Falsificationism involves the falsification of theory by observation. Randomised 
controlled trials and meta-analyses do not use falsificationism because they are set 
up to test null hypotheses. If the theory underlying the treatment intervention is not 
directly tested it cannot be falsified. When null hypothesis are rejected the alternative 
hypothesis is accepted using inference to best explanation. Falsificationism is 
characterised by its rejection of theory using deductive inferences and inference to 
best explanation is not a deductive inference. 
 
Explanatory theory is fundamental to the scientific method of falsificationism but such 
theory is not valued by hierarchies of evidence. Few hierarchies of evidence 
explicitly include explanatory theory. Again the prospective case series study design 
can be used to falsify theory but this study design is devalued by most hierarchies of 
evidence. We would therefore argue that the knowledge claims that are important 
within evidence based medicine are not justified using falsificationism. 
  
4.3. Kuhnian Paradigms: 
 
Evidence based medicine can only be considered a Kuhnian paradigm if it engages 
in puzzle solving. Puzzle solving within an established paradigm has three important 
elements: the matching of facts with theory, the articulation of the consequences of 
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theory and determination of significant facts (15). In order to determine whether 
evidence based medicine is a new Kuhnian paradigm we therefore need to consider 
whether the empirical study designs prioritised by hierarchies of evidence can be 
used to match facts with theory, articulate the consequences of theory and 
determine significant facts. 
 
Randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses do not use inductivism or 
falsificationism and they do not directly test the theory underlying the treatment 
intervention that is investigated. If underlying theory is not directly tested it is difficult 
to see how these study designs can match facts with theory or articulate the 
consequences of underlying theory. Evidence based medicine may still be 
considered normal science if the conclusions of randomised controlled trials and 
meta-analyses are significant facts. However, knowledge claims derived from these 
study designs are based upon a probabilistic interpretation of the results. We would 
suggest that knowledge claims derived in this way are not significant facts in the 
sense that Kuhn intended. This does not mean that knowledge claims derived from 
randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses cannot usefully inform clinical 
decision making. We should nonetheless avoid conflating evidence based medicine 
as a clinical decision-making tool with evidence based medicine as science. 
 
The argument that evidence based medicine does not engage in puzzle solving can 
be developed further. Scientists engaged in normal science within an established 
paradigm assume that the paradigm guarantees a solution to every puzzle. Failures 
in puzzle solving are blamed upon individual scientists not the paradigm itself. 
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However, this is not how evidence based medicine is presented (38, 39). 
Randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses are not expected to solve puzzles, 
even when they are undertaken to a high standard, because of bias inherent within 
all study designs. If randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses are not expected 
to solve puzzles evidence based medicine cannot be normal science. We would 
therefore argue that evidence based medicine cannot claim to be science using the 
theory of Kuhnian paradigms. 
 
4.4. Scientific Research Programmes: 
 
Evidence based medicine can only be considered science according to this theory if 
it is a progressive research programme. All progressive research programmes have 
a hard core of underlying theory, heuristic and continue to produce novel facts. The 
hierarchies of evidence could represent the hard core of an evidence based 
medicine research programme if they are conceived as a tool for conducting science. 
The hierarchies do possess some of the characteristic features of a hard core as 
they are generally unquestioned within evidence based medicine and they have 
changed with time. However, hierarchies of evidence consistently rank randomised 
controlled trials and meta-analyses as the highest level of evidence when theoretical 
support for this claim is uncertain (22, 40, 41, 42). We would therefore argue it is 
problematic for the hierarchies of evidence to represent a hard core of underlying 
theory for medical research programmes. 
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If hierarchies of evidence are unable to provide the hard core, we could argue that 
they could provide an important heuristic device. Several hierarchies have been 
claimed to be heuristics to facilitate rapid decision making (43, 44, 45) although this 
claim has not been extended to heuristics within a scientific research programme. If 
the hierarchies of evidence provided the heuristic there would need to be a separate 
hard core of underlying theory. To our knowledge a hard core has not previously 
been articulated although this does not mean that this could not be done. The hard 
core could possibly include axioms such as treatment interventions must be 
biologically plausible and treatment interventions that are tested in humans should 
be supported by laboratory and animal studies. 
 
Even if a hard core of underlying theory was articulated, independent of the 
hierarchies of evidence, which provided the heuristic, novel facts would still need to 
be produced for evidence based medicine to count as science$Q\µHYLGHQFHEDVHG
medicine research programme¶ZRXOGsurely prioritise knowledge claims derived 
from randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses? However, as we have seen 
these study designs do not employ inductivism or falsificationism and they reject null 
hypotheses based on probabilistic inferences. We argue that these study designs do 
not produce novel facts in the sense intended by Lakatos (13). If novel facts are not 
produced evidence based medicine cannot be progressive research programme and 
there are serious questions about whether or not it can count as science in its 
current form.  
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5. Possible Counter Arguments: 
 
The knowledge claims made by evidence based medicine are not justified by the 
theories of inductivism, falsificationism, Kuhnian paradigms or research programmes 
but this does not necessarily mean that evidence based medicine is not science. It is 
important to consider possible counter arguments in order to present a balanced 
view of evidence based medicine as science. 
 
Inductivism, falsificationism, Kuhnian paradigms and research programmes have 
been considered in detail because, from a historical perspective, they are of 
fundamental importance to the philosophy of science and we have been able to build 
upon previously published work. We acknowledge that each of these theories is 
problematic from an epistemological perspective and there are other theories about 
science that have not been considered. It could be argued that inductivism, 
falsificationism, Kuhnian paradigms and research programmes should not be used to 
determine whether a discipline is science because they are epistemologically 
problematic. We would counter argue that, in the absence of necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the demarcation of science from non-science (19), these 
theories do provide a useful guide to the status of a discipline as science. 
 
The theories presented in this paper all place a strong emphasis on underlying 
theory but this is not true of more modern theories about the nature of science. 
Experimentalism refers to a range of approaches that seek a secure basis in 
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experiment rather than underlying theory (18). Within experimentalism the results of 
experiments can provide support for a claim, in the absence of underlying theory, if 
the claim has been severely tested to eliminate possible sources of error (46). 
Experimentalism does allow a probabilistic interpretation of results and it could be 
argued that randomised controlled trials, and thus evidence based medicine, were 
science using this theory. This possible counter argument is acknowledged but it is 
important to appreciate that experimentalism is not without its own epistemological 
problems. Experimentalism has been criticised precisely because it does not value 
underlying theory (18) and it could be argued that it described a theory of empiricism 
not science.  
 
6. Conclusion: 
 
Evidence based medicine has been claimed to be science on a number of different 
occasions. This claim enhances the status of evidence based medicine and may 
make knowledge claims harder to challenge. However, although evidence based 
medicine claims to be science, the knowledge claims that are proposed through its 
methods are not derived using a process that corresponds to inductivism, 
falsificationism, Kuhnian paradigms or research programmes. This is because the 
study designs prioritised by evidence based medicine, randomised controlled trials 
and meta-analyses, accept or reject null hypotheses based on a probabilistic 
interpretation of the results. If randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses do not 
directly test underlying theory they cannot employ inductivism or falsificationism, 
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produce novel facts or engage in puzzle solving. We would therefore argue that 
evidence based medicine in its current form cannot be claimed to be scientific. 
 
If it is accepted that evidence based medicine is not science any knowledge claims 
that are made through this approach do not deserve the status of science. This strips 
the concept of its power and may make it more susceptible to challenge. This does 
not mean that evidence based medicine is not important or that the knowledge 
claims derived from this approach should not inform medical decision-making. In 
many circumstances the results of randomised controlled trials and meta-analyses 
will provide the strongest evidence to support treatment recommendations but they 
do so in a non-scientific way.  
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